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Abstract: Cyberspace has become 
an indispensable part in which 
special operations such as cyber 
war or warfare take place. The role 
of special war as the use of so-
called soft power was emphasized. 
The country's number of potential 
adversaries in cyber warfare is 
unlimited, making highly 
endangered aspects of cyber civilian 
infrastructure, which is essentially 
military readiness, including the 
mobilization of forces through the 
civilian sector, also a likely target. A 
special type of cyber war or warfare 
is hybrid warfare. This type of 
warfare is increasingly resorted to 
because it is extremely cheaper 
than the conventional method of 
warfare and at the same time brings 
exceptional results. The first thing 
that affects cyber security policy 
analysts comes with the issue of 
neutrality, as well as the huge 
variety of assessments about future 
attack and defense technologies. 
There is also a consideration that 
the new (problematic) cyber 
technology will be deployed in a 
short period of time, in time periods, 
 
and guidance, adopted the first version of the Serbian Standard SRBS 27001. He 
is one of the first Internet users in this area who had a professional obligation to 




































in just a few days in terms of 
warnings. Second, is the trends in 
cyber-attack and defense 
technologies and who is following 
those processes. Third,  decision 
making technology having in mind 
high-performance computers, 
technologies that are well known, 
although rapidly evolving, are 
increasingly seen as a basic means 
of managing cyber defense at the 
national military and security level, 
as well as a new weapon in the 
hands of opponents. Fourth, role of 
intelligence in planning future 
scenarios for defense against hybrid 
or any other cyber threat/s.   




In military theories, cyberspace is designated 
as the fifth combat space next to water, air, 
land, and space1. We are witnessing a great 
expansion of the fifth combat space, which 
knows no borders, fences, social or cultural 
barriers. This space directly enters the privacy 
of each individual and with powerful techniques 
as well as analytical programs, "learns" all 
habits of the user. In 2009, Martin Libicki, one 
of the most prominent scientists of cyber 
warfare, concludes in a report he wrote for the 
US Air Force ("United States Air Force) that 
 
1. Laurence Ifrah, “States face new challenges from 
cyberwarfare and cybercrime”, Revue Défense 








































 "the strategic doctrines of cyber warfare are 
unlikely to be decisive" and that "the operational 
level of cyber warfare plays an important role in 
the future".  
In 2012, Thomas Reed and Peter McBurney of 
King's College London noticed an important 
difference between target-specific cyber 
weapons, which can be of great value in terms 
of effect and broader applications, which are in 
comparison, lower in value than the effect 
achieved. They point out that there is a clear 
link between weapon making and high value 
that "increases the resources, intelligence and 
time required for development and 
implementation" which will "likely reduce the 
number of targets" and "political utility of cyber 
weapons". These assessments were made 
based on trends; however, trends must be 
interpreted in relation to the definitions of “cyber 
warfare” or “cyber weapons”. Libicki gave a 
definition of cyber warfare as a directed and 
individual war (does not include "real" war, only 
virtual, not physical), and Reed and McBurney 
define cyber warfare as "computer code used or 
designed to be used, with the aim of that it is a 
threat or provocation of physical conflict, that it 
is functional and that it destroys a structure, 
system or manpower2. "Cyber warfare is an 
integral part of Special War or Special Warfare. 
This type of warfare is the use of so-called "soft 
power". These are some of the main features of 
special warfare:  
 
2. Thomas Rid, Peter McBurney, Cyber Weapons, 
The RUSI journal, Volume 157, 2012 - Issue 1, 
pp.6-13. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/030






































SOFT POWER  
• Use of force in international 
relations - basic definition of power 
and force;  
• Politics from a position of force;  
• Forms of use of force in 
international relations - economic 
means (restriction of foreign trade, 
economic measures), political 
means (enemy propaganda, 
ideological pressure, psychological 
warfare, terrorism, spheres of 
interest);  
• Information operations and strategic 
communications - Objectives of 
action, Significance and levels of 
execution, Stages of implementation 
and levels of operations, Content 
and methods of implementation, 
Forces for execution, Means for 
application of psychological 
operations, Principles of execution 
(planning, execution stages, 
intelligence, implementation), 
Effects of operations (evaluation 
and correction).  
 
An important type of information operations is 
cyber warfare. There are at least three 
important dimensions to the problem of possible 
cyber warfare without such estimates being 
taken into account:  
• Will the cost / benefit ratio in 








































 advanced use of cyber weapons be 
more favorable over a period of 10-
20 years?  
• Will the political character of 
progress in the field of cyber 
weapons in countries initiate the 
accumulation of entire cyber 
arsenals, rather than individual 
cyber weapons?  
• Will the political character of 
progress in the field of cyber 
weapons distance countries from 
conventional military strategies in 
the information age, through a 
strategy in which the dominance of 
information achieves a decisive 
advantage and capability? The 
answer to all three questions would 
be yes.  
In time, the conclusions drawn by Libicki, Reed 
and McBurney will probably be less relevant. 
For the purposes of discussion and analysis of 
the national strategy, we must point out the very 
dynamic character of the area that represents a 
possible cyber war. As a country of 
accumulated capabilities, technological 
capabilities and options in the IT sector, we 
need to recognize and recognize the real and 
key interests of most governments of developed 
countries and their efforts to resolutely move 
towards information domination, as a strategy 
of possible cyber war. Proper and timely 
consideration of our own real possibilities (from 
technical to organizational) can be a decisive 
advantage in preventing or reducing the harmful 
consequences of cyber attacks on our 
information systems, critical infrastructure or 




































warfare, knowledge and human resource 
capabilities are a key advantage, perhaps even 
superiority.  
One of the best descriptions of the dynamics of 
change may be the book "America of the 
Vulnerable" by Joel Brenner, former inspector 
general of the US National Security Agency, 
who takes a highly non-technical approach to 
the political and economic foundations of war 
and strategy3. We will illustrate the previous 
points with the basic elements from our 
knowledge of how China reacted to the United 
States and its capabilities for information 
operations, starting with the first Gulf War in 
1991, with in-depth attention to cyber fire. This 
is essential for understanding that cyber 
warfare technology and strategy are made 
possible by information domination!  
One of the essential conclusions of Brenner's 
book is that cyber warfare as a real life 
phenomenon (involving budgets, soldiers, 
politicians, industries and war / battle) is 
currently in its infancy and that it could soon be 
a very real threat. Brenner concludes that his 
country "cannot defend its electronic networks 
controlled by energy companies, prevent air 
crashes, enable reliable financial transactions 
or allow the president to communicate with his 
cabinet at the level of secure communication." 
The country's number of potential adversaries 
in cyber warfare is unlimited, making highly 
endangered aspects of cyber civilian 
infrastructure, which is essentially military 
readiness, including the mobilization of forces 
 
3. Joel Brenner, America the Vulnerable: Inside the 
New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, 








































 through the civilian sector, also a likely target. 
("Electronically Undressed").  
If the United States cannot defend its critical 
infrastructure in cyberspace at the moment, and 
it turns out that it cannot, if the world is on the 
brink of rapid expansion of cyber warfare and 
the capabilities of potential cyber aggressors 
against Serbia, implications for Serbia and the 
government that needs to become aware e and 
at this point we have no answers to such a 
scenario. Brenner emphasizes a package of 
policy measures, most of which are very 
reasonable. While little deals with issues of 
combat capability of war or strategy, all 
resources represent potential contributions to 
national security readiness in cyberspace. For 
example, he calls for the need to move towards 
a highly secure computer system (Secure 
Computing or the use of "proven software" 
programs) through the promotion and public 
support of high demands in this area.  
The implications of such a transition can be 
summed up in the claim that governments 
tolerate too long exposure to their security and 
the vulnerability of national information 
systems4. A study by the East West Institute 
called on governments to "send clear signals to 
enable IT innovation and security drive, starting 
from the top down, with the highest security 
requirements and the highest value goals." 
More importantly, the Institute called on 
governments to "cooperate internationally and 
quickly grasp this new paradigm and stop the 






































before more damage is done5." We can also 
notice the contrast of three assessments which 
are a real indicator of the difference between 
the advanced aspect of planning and the 
backward aspect, precisely on the example of 
Serbia: "Serbia has not yet been subjected to 
any activities that could be considered a cyber-
attack"; "Strong cyber defense will enable a 
high degree of trust in networks and information 
security"; "The fact that in 2014, for the first 
time, destructive cyber attacks were carried out 
on American soil, on national / state authorities 
of the USA" warns that "we must be ready for 
large-scale disasters - the so-called cyber 
Armageddon "or that" unpredictable instability is 
the new norm "and that cyber threats have 
been realized" of low intensity on the network of 
nation states, that information conflict is 
becoming the rule, not the exception "(From the 
report of the University of Georgia Tech - 
Georgia Institute of Technology for 20156.)  
The differences between the first assessment 
and the other two are more than visible. The 
Serbian doctrine seems to reduce to the 
postulate “when the country is not attacked, the 
country is safe and secure in cyberspace.” Is 
that so? assessments from American sources 
painted a completely different picture: Serbia 
was probably attacked without knowing it (the 
attack is still going on ?!), so it is no longer safe, 
it is probably much less safe than the United 
 
5. EestWest Institute, Annual Report 2020,  
https://www.eastwest.ngo/sites/default/files/ideas-
files/ewi-2018-annual-report.pdf 
6. Emerging Cyber Threats Report 2015, The 










































 States, and Special features of cyber war 
Leaving aside the great powers and their 
preparations for cyber war, for a moment, there 
are other important political and strategic 
aspects of the war in cyberspace, which are 
important regardless of the country and which 
will also develop - probably in the next 10-20 
years. Serbia should also take these aspects 
into account. First, there is the new potential 
that cyberspace offers for an asymmetric war of 
weak military forces (and non-state actors) 
against states that are clearly superior in the 
conventional military sense7.  
Although this concept has been present for a 
long time, it is not a static phenomenon, but it is 
changing with the progress of technology. 
Asymmetric warfare is the first of three possible 
military threats facing the United States. The 
other two are strategic threats from weapons of 
mass destruction and threats of regional 
conflicts. Asymmetric threats are defined in the 
United States as those in which "state and non-
state opponents avoid direct engagement with 
the U.S. military but use new strategies, tactics, 
and improved weapons of" lateral "technologies 
to minimize U.S. strengths and exploit 
perceived weaknesses8."  
 
7. Darko Trifunović, International Security and 
Asymmetric Threats, Asymmetry and Strategy, 
University of Defence Strategic Research 
Institute & National Defence School, Belgrade, 
Serbia, 2018.pp.47-62 
8. Franklin B. Miles, Asymmetric Warfare: An 
Historical Perspective, US Army College, Carlisle 





































There is a constant threat of "cyber war" all 
over the world, and this threat is the first on the 
list of threats. Secondly, there is the possibility 
of "transmitting" the war, ie. there is an ability 
(and practice of the experienced) that will 
become increasingly important over time. 
Simply put, a transferred war is the transfer of 
war at the national level of the coercive power 
of either the state or an individual to initiate 
individual actions and reflects the 
decentralization of political power. There are 
several ways to understand this phenomenon in 
relation to military applications. One is to look at 
the role of patriotic hackers, whose potential in 
war can be compared to partisan forces 
capable of interfering with the enemy, but who 
are either loosely connected to their command 
or not connected at all, often acting against its 
interests or expressions.  
Patriotic hacking is an important and developed 
phenomenon in Serbia, but also in the world, 
primarily in China, South Korea and Japan, 
USA…. Another dimension of the transmitted 
war is the contribution and role of cyber militias, 
people who have a civilian day job, but who, 
under the direction of national security, can 
participate in national security activities in the 
short term, including cyber war if necessary. As 
already mentioned, China has an active 
program for the development of cyber special 
units, but it also relies on its unique political 
system in companies.  
The United States does not have such explicit 
reliance on cyber special forces, in part 
because it has an established network of high-
tech companies that can be quickly and easily 
co-opted into national security activities if 








































 10,000 "clean" companies with secret technical 
aspects of intelligence needs. These forms of 
transmission of war are a sufficient challenge 
for national security activity. Confirmation of this 
allegation is the Snowden affair, in which one of 
those employees was able to use his individual 
"Network Power" and explode by opening up 
some of the most sensitive aspects of cyber 
warfare capabilities and preparation. With 
Snowden’s revelation of “Operation Prism”, 
which involved nine leading U.S. corporations in 
direct and large-scale engagement in U.S. 
national security missions in cyberspace, it did 
even more damage in the end in which these 
companies reacted by distancing themselves 
from either which political subordination or 
participation in the national distribution of cyber 
war. Microsoft, for example, has clearly defined 
its position to treat all customers equally, 
including the United States and China. But the 
biggest challenge is the transfer of war, and 
there is a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the central command and 
its deployed units.  
In an era of information domination and 
concrete enemy plans to cut off command and 
control, either through cyber or kinetic means, 
all military units must now have ways to 
reconnect if major links in the central chain are 
broken down. As already mentioned, China has 
responded to this much more clearly than most 
countries in its recent military strategy (May 
2015).  
It also announces the weakening of the central 
command authority in order to nurture the 
conditions for winning the cyber war under the 
motto "self-dependence" for certain military 




































One of the political consequences of the 
distribution of warfare and their asymmetric 
potential is that it can also break the traditional 
value of military alliances, especially the 
provisions of extended intimidation. Serbia 
benefits from the technical support of its 
intelligence allies, preparing for cyber warfare 
and conducting an information operation. 
Serbian forces also enjoy significant integration 
into advanced command structures and control 
arrangements. There is, however, significant 
evidence to suggest that the reliance of a 
middle power, such as Serbia, on alliances 
between states for prolonged deterrence may 
not have as much impact in cyberspace as it 
does on kinetic operations. The United States 
has agreed with NATO partners that an attack 
in cyberspace could constitute an armed attack 
for the purpose of calling for a mutual response 
under Article 5 of the treaty.  
The question is, however, whether the cyber 
intrusion of a belligerent character or 
preparatory for war, in practice, will attract the 
support of the United States within the NATO 
alliance. It is more than likely that middle-power 
allies in the United States will have a greater 
degree of self-confidence in cyberspace than in 
maintaining the kinetic capabilities of military 
cooperation because recognizing thresholds for 
intrusion or attack in cyberspace is far less 
determined and developed and much more 
ambiguous than in kinetic. scenario.  
There is little room for doubt about the 
intentions when several bombers of one country 
violated the airspace of another without prior 
approval. This would pose a danger of an 
armed attack. The same clarity does not yet 








































 careful here, because Russia's cyber attacks on 
vital countries of their interest have always 
preceded kinetic force. This is what happened 
in the case of the Russian aggression on 
Georgia. A massive cyber attack was carried 
out in preparation for a tank invasion9.  
 
Future attack and defense systems  
Trends in cyber attack and defense 
technologies have been described in many 
publications: by government agencies, 
scientists, experts, but also by hackers. They 
are of importance for the needs of 
benchmarking ("benchmarking") of national 
security, and range across all eight base 
vectors in the "cyber color", but they also 
include those that reduce and combine 
individual vectors. This could be called "system 
of systems" technology. The scale of the 
challenge in predicting attack and defense 
technologies should not be discouraged by 
anyone's misunderstanding of cybersecurity. 
The first thing that affects cyber security policy 
analysts comes with the issue of neutrality, as 
well as the huge variety of assessments about 
future attack and defense technologies.  
There is also a consideration that the new 
(problematic) cyber technology will be deployed 
in a short period of time, in time periods, in just 
a few days in terms of warnings. From the point 
of view of benchmarking Serbia for the needs of 
national security, this discussion discourse 
 
9. Paul B. Rich, Crisis in the Caucasus: Russia, 





































carries only a few ideas about future systems 
that are not particularly pronounced in the 
public debate by officials or among experts in 
Serbia. If you look closely at the horizon of 
specialists from a typical security point of view, 
characterizing the development of threats 
around complex cyber attacks is a useful place 
to start. In 2015, U.S. analyst Karl Herberger, 
vice president of Security Solutions, reported 
that in 2013, the average cyber attack included 
seven vector attacks (although some attacks 
were over 25 vector attacks), different phases 
(each with several waves), with successive 
phases and relying on the methods they 
performed in the previous phase, but by adding 
new vector attacks10.  
The following attack vectors are most often 
mentioned:  
1. Compromise of personal data such as 
passwords and passwords.  
2. Weak passwords, passwords and 
those that can be easily predicted.  
3. Malicious insiders, usually referring to 
employed insiders within a company or 
institution.  
4. Non-existent or poor data encryption.  
5. Incorrectly configured system.  
6. Cyber extortion, exists when the user 
is denied access to data by the attacker 
and is asked for a certain amount of 
money to access. 7. “Phishing” is a 
method used by cybercriminals to trick a 
 
10. Carl Herberger, How to Defend Against 










































 user into accessing their personal 
information, such as a bank account.  
8. Trust relations, exist when trust 
between users or systems develops to a 
certain extent11.  
In addition to vector attacks, four characteristics 
in the emergence of threats can be isolated: 
coordinated persistent threat of actors, dynamic 
polymorphic malware, multi-vector attacks and 
multi-phase attack. These characterizations are 
very important indicators, but they do not warn 
us how careful we must be. On the one hand, 
they deal only with a limited part of the attack 
vector, and do not say much about the defense 
system.  
As one of the leading international examples of 
future defense systems, we can look at how 
critical infrastructure protection is recognized by 
recognized world leaders in cyber defense, the 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL), which 
emphasizes that the focus is not military 
battlefield systems, but also defines many 
standards. for the development of combat 
systems and for the creators of the doctrine of 
defense, as well as cyber leaders who must be 
able to not depend on a certain critical 
infrastructure. After all, there is no victory in war 
without preserved critical infrastructure. And 
when we talk about the terrorist threat that is 
more and more present, a special danger arises 
when terrorists gather information related to 
critical infrastructure, which allows them to 
detect vulnerabilities and set targets.  
 
11. 8 Common Cyber Attack Vectors and How to 






































From airports and other transport-related 
infrastructure to society-critical electricity and 
water supply systems (including nuclear power 
plants), serious damage to critical infrastructure 
can cause direct and indirect large losses, 
including loss of life12. We can take the case of 
power supply, which is only one of the eight 
vectors of cyber security. This system, although 
under the management and control of digital 
assets, also mostly ignores the vector of attacks 
and responses in cyberspace. This was the 
subject of testimony by INL Director Brent 
Stacey on 21 October 2015, who emphasized 
that any country considering cybersecurity has 
significant cause for concern due to the 
following facts: 
• The assumption that the control 
system is “manual” or. that such a 
system is not an effective cyber 
security strategy.  
• Intrusion detection technology is not 
well developed for network system 
control; the average length of time 
to detect an attack / intrusion is four 
months and is usually identified by a 
third party.  
• As the complexity and "connection" 
of system control services 
increases, the probability of 
unplanned system failures 
 
12. B. Todorović, D. Trifunović, Security Science as 
A Scientific Discipline - Technological Aspects, 
Security Science Journal, No. 1 (2020), Belgrade, 











































 increases, which is an uncontrolled 
consequence - independence from 
malware. 
• A dynamic threat develops faster 
than a cycle of measures and 
countermeasures, and far faster 
than the evolution of doctrine.  
• The need for trained cyber security, 
with knowledge of system control, 
far exceeds our current readiness.  
 
The type of defensive response cited in the 
professional literature is also instructive13. It is 
an identified approach in three points:  
1. Hygiene: "the foundation of our 
nation's proactivity, composed from day 
to day, applied measures and counter-
struggles"; "important routine tasks such 
as standards, compliance, password 
sharing and management"; "with the 
role of industry in agreement with 
property owners."  
2. Advanced permanent threat: "more 
sophisticated cyber weapons" require a 
"strategic cyber partnership with industry 
and government." This level of 
partnership in Serbia is still in the 
process of development, so cyber 
 
13. Greg Austin, Middle Powers and Cyber-Enabled 
Warfare: The Imperative of Collective Security, 








































defense is possible through critical 
capacity and a wave of reactions by 
issuing warnings of current 
vulnerabilities to owners of public and 
private funds “ 
3. High impact low frequency events:" 
catastrophic and potentially cascading 
events they require a lot of time for 
assessment, response and recovery. 
This level is primarily the responsibility 
of government and institutions. “ 
Research has focused on the two highest 
priority levels (# 2 and # 3 in the list above), 
with the aim of establishing a“two to four year 
cycle of research-to-deployment ”and to“ 
achieve transformations of innovation that 
improve the security of our infrastructure forces 
by reducing complexity, implementing cyber-
information design, and integrating selected 
digital enhancements. "Laboratories" have the 
great challenge of developing new and 
deployable solutions to remove the high-value 
infrastructure asset from the table as a cyber 
target. " paradigm shift in the methods used for 
the historical development of the control 
system”.  
This paradigm is based on the fact of traditional 
trust and relationships in communication are no 
longer a satisfactory assumption14. Instead, the 
resilient design of control systems expects a 
malicious attack or action to be a mask of 
normal operation and designed for the ability of 
the system to be in action to prevent or mitigate 
such actions. Serbia does not have a 
comprehensive procedure to respond remotely 










































 developed countries, and in fact a lot of effort 
has been made on the lowest priorities (# 1 on 
the list above) in which the hygiene of operators 
and companies in cyber security is identified.  
Analysis of Great Britain in 2012 provides some 
additional insights into threat processes and 
cyber resilience of another aspect of critical 
infrastructure, financial services financial vector. 
The study is based on consultations with the 
economy. Three main aspects are considered, 
among others. The Internet will become 
increasingly central in our economy and our 
society. First, the growing role of cyberspace 
has also opened up new threats as well as new 
opportunities - we have no choice but to find 
ways to address and overcome these threats if 
the UK wants to grow more economically in a 
competitive and globalized world. Second, the 
digital architecture we now rely on is built to be 
efficient and interoperable. At the beginning of 
the creation of the Internet, security aspects 
were not or were less considered. However, as 
we use the Internet more and spend a good 
part of our lives on this network, the issue of 
security has become more and more important. 
People want to make sure that networks that 
support our national security, our economy and 
prosperity, and our own privacy as individuals 
are secure. Third, unfortunately, an increasing 
number of threats come from those who use 
cyberspace to steal, who seek to compromise 
or destroy personal information. Cyber attacks 
can affect our critical infrastructure, our 
workplaces and ultimately our homes. It is for 




































Strategy 2010 has made this threat a “Level 1” 
threat of the highest priority15.  
Academic studies on a similar topic warn of the 
danger of underestimating risk and isolation: 
"Assessing the risk of naive aggregation of risks 
due to its high reliability and safety and failures 
according to the 'do not catch on' model." This 
is called a “biased security choice” model that 
“reduces the effectiveness of security 
defenses”. Looking to future doctrines, cyber 
security is exposed to complex risks, about 
which very little is known despite their great 
importance.  
Decision-making technologies  
High-performance computers, technologies that 
are well known, although rapidly evolving, are 
increasingly seen as a basic means of 
managing cyber defense at the national military 
and security level, as well as a new weapon in 
the hands of opponents. Sandia Laboratory 
sets up and develops future "decision-making 
technologies" based on high computing 
performance. It would be useful for Serbian 
commands (in considering their strategic 
weapons, including indicators and warnings) to 
understand these aspects in the vector of 
analogies and attempts to create an advantage 
in cyberspace, as a global civilian domain, to 
the extent of global strategic systems.  
 
15. The UK Cyber Security Strategy Protecting and 











































 The study sets as the principle core of 
operational claims that cyber security is a 
terrain for national decision-making and that it 
represents a "continuous life cycle with human, 
organizational, legal and technical 
interdependencies." It identifies seven high 
priorities, "broad area problems" in the field of 
cyber security, which are of great importance in 
medium intensity and potential for a country like 
Serbia, in understanding its technology for 
deciding on a possible cyber war.  
These problems and priorities, listed literally, 
are as follows:  
1. Unrelated wide-ranging response and 
multi-targeted attack;  
2. Widespread and fragmented 
detection of notifications and 
opportunities;  
3. Poorly defined state, trade and 
academic roles and responsibilities;  
4. Divided and rigid doctrine in the broad 
field of cyberspace protection;  
5. Unresolved area of single and joint 
risk;  
6. Fragile and interdependent 
deployment of a broad approach to 
critical approach and operations;  
7. Unresolved review, attribution of 
attacks and compromises.  
The authors concluded, proposing areas for 
further research in computer performance, to 
promote the decision on national security or. 
decision for cyberspace. It is not surprising that 
US state laboratories have the scope of work 
and enormous resources to deal with such 
challenges, in contrast to scientists who belong 




































supported by their governments and do not 
have the same opportunities.  
As for Serbia, in the absence of public 
announcement of a range of similar activities at 
the strategic level of warfare, we can probably 
conclude that the scope and means for such an 
analysis, and subsequent actions, are 
negligible. Serbia has well-developed research 
resources in the application of high computer 
performance, but in the absence of public 
records, it could be concluded that they are not 
adequately applicable to cyber activities, 
especially to the requirements of deciding on a 
possible cyber war at the strategic level. If we 
analyze the ecosystem of possible threats and 
defenses, which stem from a mere "handful" of 
technology trends (and responses to those 
trends), it can only be concluded that small and 
mid-level powers like Serbia are looking at a 
pipe of almost insurmountable challenges, 
unless they are trained to develop complex 
appropriate decision-making systems for 
medium-level cyber warfare, dealing with 
simultaneous multi-vector, multi-threat and 
multi-spatial cyber-attack from an identified 
enemy, including against civilian infrastructure 
and civilians in cyber warfare. And all that 
needs to be protected now before we start 
thinking about new technologies such as 
quantum computer systems, biocomputers, 
anti-satellite weapons, mass deployment of 
bots as deployed units in space, return to 
traditional communications for cyber activities 
and laser-based communications.  
Scenario and planning for a possible cyber war  
There are many components of planning, 








































 future in cyberspace. One of the most important 
is intelligence, which is the basis for answering 
the questions:  
• What other countries are cyber 
threats, what are they doing and 
planning to do?  
• What would they do in certain 
circumstances based on what we 
know?  
• How would future technologies 
affect their military strategies?  
 
These are some of the topics of the necessary 
re-examination of Serbia. An additional tool is 
scenario development, which is especially 
useful in the context of uncertainty about 
intelligence services, because this is certainly 
more than possible in cyber warfare. The value 
of planning in a cyber war and the feasible 
scenario is highly valued, especially since the 
plans of a possible cyber war of potential 
opponents of Serbia, and even the plans of its 
allies, will probably remain non-transparent.  
The planning benefit and the simulation 
scenario indicated the need for strict control. 
There are classic elements of surveillance, 
such as elucidating possible scenarios of 
geopolitical activities, but also aspects of 
cyberspace and scenarios for their ability to 
extort alternative responses in future 
technologies and in creating incentives for 
change among doctrine creators. In the 
mentioned analysis, the authors also refer to 




































doctrines of approach to possible future trends 
in cyber warfare.  
Above all, the authors of the analysis 
recommend the use of scenarios as a concrete 
preactive means of reducing strategic surprise 
("Reducing the impact of uncertainty through 
the notion of robustness"). Most major powers 
have been involved in planning scenarios for 
civilian cyber emergencies. They have 
published few details of the scenario for a 
cyber-possible war, but there is data for a 
demonstration scenario. As one example, in 
late 2014, the U.S. government conducted an 
exercise, the “Cyber Flag,” on a number of non-
public ownership scenarios and elements.  
Among the scenarios were:  
• A joint force to respond to regional 
crises involving significant military 
cyber activity;  
• Full range of military operations of 
combat cyber targets; 
• Alliance of cyber operations from 
the air, land and naval forces;  
• Simulation of cyber attacks and 
analysis of the impact on national 
command and control.16 
This form of exercise and simulation is very 
useful, but like most exercises, it is specific to 
 
16. ‘Cyber Flag’ Exercise Tests Mission Skills, From 
A U.S. Cyber Command News Release,US 











































 training and has developmental benefits that 
should be limited to the developmental stage of 
the forces involved in the exercise and do not 
reflect the overall cyber war situation. military 
planners at the executive level of government 
will plan and prepare.For the purpose of 
assessing the best international practice in the 
development of scenarios, ie planning for 
unforeseen cyber warfare, it would be important 
to undertake more detailed studies, because no 
prospect of a possible cyber war in Serbia has 
been sufficiently analyzed and assessed.  
But for the purposes of this paper, it may be 
sufficient to emphasize that defense planning at 
the national level, with respect to future cyber 
warfare, is crucial. Either we will be a "kingdom 
of the blind" if Serbia does not build the 
capacity for opposition, or these capacities will 
be built at all levels of the state and 
society. One of the most discussed examples in 
the United States is the case of the military 
conflict with China over Taiwan. This is an 
example that is very credible and includes a 
wide range of cyber attacks against American 
civilian infrastructure in order to prevent the 
mobilization of American forces or to delay their 
deployment in the Western Pacific.  
For a country like Serbia, the list of possible 
cyber threats and attacks is long:  
• Cyber-hybrid threats to Europe, 
• Cyber-hybrid threats to Serbia,  
• Cyber-criminal gangs , 
• Individual cases of cybercrime or 




































Consideration of such scenarios leads us to 
only one of three possible conclusions about 
Serbian doctrine. First: the medium intensity of 
a possible cyber war is known and in such a 
scenario we have to make the necessary 
planning. Or else: we have not studied enough 
to know whether national consensus has 
developed on what type of possible cyber war 
is, regardless of the fact that we have already 
faced one. Or third: we cannot observe the 
cyber military doctrine of the Serbian 
government for the following reasons:  
• because we do not have an open 
and honest public conversation with 
key actors about the type of threats 
and possible scenarios for our cyber 
armed forces and the community 
facing moderate cyber warfare;  
• because Serbia has not developed 
a defense doctrine for the cyber 
armed forces, with the support of 
the civilian sector, which would 
credibly play a relevant role in these 
scenarios;  
• because there is no preventive 
diplomatic strategy to reduce the 
risk of such a war in Serbian 
diplomacy;  
• because there is no articulated 
civilian defense strategy for the 
inevitable high impact of 
technological threats and the 
disruption of our civic economy in 
the community in the event of a 









































• because there is no place in politics 
for the development of our IT 
industry base and workforce that 
can withstand all of the above to the 
extent that our national IT economy 




Opponents or opponents will increasingly rely 
on technological means to carry out their 
operations, using cyber capabilities to control or 
support “hybrid operations.” Hybrid warfare is 
not a classic military war that signifies armed 
conflict. Hybrid warfare is waged by 
unconventional means, primarily through the 
application of information technologies in, so to 
speak, the newly created space when we define 
it as cybernetic. This area has become very 
important for the work of security services in 
terms of defining possible threats coming from 
this area, but also in terms of conducting 
special psychological operations according to 
the identified goals, whether it is a state, 
community, people, vital infrastructure or even 
important individuals. Hybrid warfare is part of a 
special war, but the term refers to a specific 
action backed by a foreign intelligence service 
or services using modern means such as the 
Internet, social networks, portals, and specially 
designed sites in the cyber sphere. Cyber 
conflicts and cyber wars are great examples of 
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